Scholars of the Asia Minor Catastrophe have often wondered if there was a possible solution other than the one that emerged in 1922. Could the retreat of the Greek army and the flight of the Asia Minor Greeks with significant civilian losses have been avoided? An act of population exchange under normal conditions would have been impossible, as any politician attempting it would face the wrath of the people and possibly political condemnation. Was Venizelos' action to bring Greek forces to Smyrna in 1919 misguided? As the Young Turks had created unbearable conditions for minorities, Greece had to choose between silence and responding to the demands of the Greeks of Asia Minor. If, as it seemed then, the empire was dissolving and the victors of the war were dividing its territorial spoils, then Venizelos' choice seemed correct. However, the war between Greeks and Turks on Turkish soil made the fate of the Greeks in Asia Minor problematic. Venizelos himself had changed his stance from the eve of the campaign in Sangarios and advised his supporters to seek disengagement from the campaign. Metaxas, who refused to accept the command from Gounaris and Theotokis, explained to his like-minded associates that the undertaking they had embarked on was unfeasible. Considering Turkish nationalism since the emergence of the Young Turks, it would have been impossible, given the number of Greek residents compared to that of the Turks, to hold onto Asia Minor. The Asia Minor Catastrophe was certainly disastrous for the uprooted Greeks who arrived as destitute refugees in their country of origin. However, for the subsequent development of Greece, this transfusion of human resources from Asia Minor had beneficial effects, especially in the economy, literature, arts, the modernization of the country, and its cultural unity.