In the dispute or dialectic of modern versus post-modern, both sides are right. The case does not allow for a definitive judgment; the arguments and language games that both sides oppose are asymptotic and futile, like the announcements of couriers talking about a cloud. The pending difference is not expressed; the stakes testify that testimony is impossible; there is no foundation because we never have a foundation.

What, then, should be judged? What is judged when `the judging is this here`? Shall we assume that modern and post-modern are equivalent? That the post-modern paradoxically lies at the heart of modernity, when Mallarme announces the judgment and its judgment, urging us to judge the `very modern taste`?

Shall we think that the re-conception of truth will occur within the fleeting and in its experience, that is, in what cannot be represented? That the question of whether modernity is a `continuation` of the Enlightenment is invalid, and that the notorious dispute re-engages the old deceit of the gods, the deceit of a philosophy of the consciousness of a man in place of God?

Are we facing here the cunning of Reason and History? Are we in a Hegelian deadlock where the two terms of `opposition` taken as such justify themselves, being led? Yet, `to the same degree in error`, leaving -as in tragedy- the dispute open?

And the dispute, this reasoning but also this discourse (discursus) between modernity and itself (the post-modern), is it not the purpose (and end) of philosophy today, regarding the present for which philosophy deserves to exist?